Extracts from ‘THE LEGITIMISER’ by Graham Macfarlane (1999)

 

Chapter two

 

Part One: Post-Ironic Advertising

 The Teacher: One of the first recorded uses of the word Post-ironic occurred in an article published in The Guardian on the 13/8/97. It was used in relation to advertising, where the journalist described a series of adverts they had seen in America for up-coming shows on NBC as post-ironic. One such advert simply featured a plate of wobbling jelly for about 15 seconds, followed at the end by a voice-over saying “If you’ll watch this, then you’ll watch anything” and then proceeded to list that night’s shows.  Interestingly, a more recent example as innocuous as this seems, something very, very profound is at stake in invoking this term, even if it was used erroneously.

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The Student: Isn’t it just ironic and therefore postmodern?

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The Teacher: No.

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The Student: So, is it post-ironic and therefore post-postmodern (whatever that means)?

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The Teacher: It's certainly a step forwards/backwards from pm.

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The Student: WHY?

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The Teacher: The issue of TRUTH.

 

 

Part Two – The Rules of The Legitimiser

The Student: What is truth?

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The Teacher: Many have asked such a question! However, for truth to have any value for more than just ourselves, there needs to be some form of legitimisation taking place, outside of ourselves, otherwise what you say is truth and what I say it is, could be a constant bone of contention that is never able to be resolved. In other words, there must be a Legitimiser of some kind, an ultimate ‘stamper’, that yeah’s or neigh’s the truth in question. Here are the rules: 

Rule 1: A legitimiser can act only on that which is sought.

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Subjective------>objective

individual----------->the legitimiser

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Rule 2: A legitimiser can only legitimise outside of the individual.

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However, if you include the legitimiser within the system of language, you can't do the above!

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The student: So, the legitimiser must be separate and therefore outside of the system?

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The Teacher: Yes, but someone like Jean Baudriallard (author of ‘Simulacra and Simulations’ and the philosopher whose ideas were borrowed for The Matrix trilogy) would disagree--->there is no means of legitimisation, there is no ultimate truth. Everything stands within the system of language and meaning, including a legitimiser. Hence the conclusion that someone like JP Lyotard, another famous Postmodern philosopher, draws: “Postmodernism is a fundamental suspicion of all meta-narratives (grand truths)”. Doubt, then, according to these men, is the condition of the age.

There is no way out from here, holding this standpoint.

 

 

Part Three – The Signifier and The Signified

The Teacher: This is the state of language and meaning today, according to Jacques Derrida and Baudriallard, the two leading post-structuralists.  

 Language contains within it no guarantee of truth/meaning.

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the signifier-------------------->the signified

(thing that is signifying something) (what the signifier                                      signifies)

              /                                /

The word                     what this word means

 

The two have now become separated, so that there is no association, no bond, no link between WHAT IS SAID AND WHAT THIS MEANS. This is because there is no source for legitimisation. Therefore, no words can mean anything, can have any content that can be considered TRUTH, because, as you pointed out, what is truth?

 

the signifier-->     <--the signified

                    /                      /

                the truth      what the truth is--->THE                                LEGITIMISER?

 

If you believe that there is no connection any longer between these two, i.e. that they are random elements, one truth could be replaced by another in the signified area and there'll still be no way of actually knowing which is the right one. A simple example is the word “Gay”. It essentially has three meanings and depending on what generation you come from, you will attach a different connation to it. If you are, say, over 80, then the chances are you’ll think this word means happy or glad, full of life. If you’re in your mid-30’s and above you’d understand this meaning, but you would also know that it has come to mean same-sex attraction. If, however, you’re in your teen’s/twenties then you’ll b familiar with these meanings, but you may also use the word as a way of describing something as naff/crap. Of course, I don’t mean to be so rigid, and it’s likely that if you have kids you’ll hear them use the word in the last way and pick up what they mean. But the point of shifting ‘signifieds’ is illustrated, I think.  This is because there is no ultimate legitimiser, no ultimate source of legitimisation, since all words, including the word “Legitimiser”, are caught up in the same vicious circle of needing to be legitimised by something outside the system of language:

 

the signifier-------->the signified

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           "Legitimiser"--------->The ultimate truth and source of all truth (which presupposes, starts with the premise of, it's existence)

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The student: But who says the Legitimiser exists?

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The Teacher: Exactly! The Legitimiser does, but how do we know they exist by the word "Legitimiser". Someone outside of the "Legitimiser" must legitimise this word, must give this meaning. How do we know that the signified IS the signified?--->words have become detached from their meaning, because of the conclusion by the post-structuralists that they are trapped in this vicious circle of language, if you deconstruct every truth. This is essentially what Derrida is getting at when he says, "nothing exists outside of the text".

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The Student: So how does the Legitimiser escape this conundrum? If I follow you, you’re saying that in this case the Legitimiser can't say that what is signified is in fact signified, because it is the one who is in question.

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The Teacher: That’s right. The question cannot answer the question, if you will.

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The Student: So how does the Legitimiser solve this riddle?

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The Teacher: I’ll come to that presently. All in good time.

 

 

Chapter three

 

Part one

 

The Student: If there is no way out, what happens?

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The Teacher: We go into Pandora's Box deeper and deeper.

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The Student: How does this manifest itself in the world around us?

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The Teacher: Through examples such as post-ironic advertising

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The Student: How?

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The Teacher: The truth becomes so flippant, so up for grabs, and so substitutional, that anything can be put in its name and called truth. EVEN A LIE.

And you can admit the lie and still get away with it, because WE ARE IMMUNE TO THIS SHIFT.

 

 

Chapter six

 

Part one:

A question of Faith

 

And thus we come to the crux of the matter: Faith

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The Student: Faith in what?

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The Teacher: Faith in our belief systems that we have been forced to create for ourselves.

At the end of the day, if you say that there can be no legitimiser, you are putting your faith in this supposition, because you can never know either way. Reason has its limit. Postmodernism has shown once again this to be the case, but in a way in which I think the point is proven beyond argument. Existentialism also showed this in the fact that none of the existentialists, with the exception of Kierkegaarde, could ultimately transcend nihilism, though Nietzsche, in particular, tried very hard. With existentialism, the pointlessness of the exercise is admitted and yet there is still a belief that one must attempt to overcome the problem of existence, to avoid ‘bad faith’ in JP Sartre’s terms, through a call to action. That is, we must try and make sense of the dilemma even though, in essence, we are doomed to fail (because of the human condition we find ourselves in). If one reads Sartre, this is the ultimate conclusion one arrives at, for me, at least.

With existentialism, the philosophical argument moved from a switch from speculative philosophy, which dealt in the area of pure reason/thought, to a philosophy rooted in personal experience.

With postmodernism, the area of combat is language itself; the language used, of course, by philosophers as with all other humans. The nihilism is identified in that reason is shown to have its limits in language. Language is self-defeating. That is the conclusion of the post-structuralists. Therefore, there are flaws in every argument (deconstruction) and an inability of man to know anything is ultimately true (a suspicion of all grand/objective truths); not because of man's condition (as in Sartre’s theory of the en-soi and pour-soi and the inability of us to know anything in its entirety), but because of language. And this is a more fundamental dilemma then anything else. I would proffer that it actually leaves us in a more nihilist position than at any time. As I have argued already, we find ourselves locked inside a prison, having thrown away the key that unlocks the door. Nihilism * n+1.

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So reason has its limits, as Kierkegaarde first identified(1). It leaves us still facing the fundamental problem of how do I know that I know that I know something IS? And the consequence of this fundamental problem is that how do I know that I know that I know there is a legitimiser? The very same legitimiser who is the only thing that can save me from this conundrum and unlock the door to the prison I am in. I AM IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION OF NOT BEING ABLE TO KNOW THE VERY THING, WHICH I NEED TO KNOW IN ORDER TO ALLOW ME TO KNOW ANYTHING.

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But of course, we don't live like this. We live under the faith that what we know IS; what we believe (our worldview) is valid (and therefore contains a truth) and what we do (that is, what decisions we make based on our worldview) has some kind of meaning and content.

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But I have just shown how this stands in direct contradiction to the way it really is. Reason, then, has its limits for answering any of the above questions. It cannot answer them; philosophy has shown this. Yet, very often, we live as though this were not true.

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Q: How have we done this?

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A: By transcending reason and moving to the level of faith.

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Q: Faith in what?

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A: Faith in the fact that what we know knows IS. Faith in the fact that what we believe is valid. Faith in the fact that the decisions we make have meaning and content to them.

We cannot ever know all these can be so, but we believe that they are, by having faith in the knowledge that they are and hope in being proved right.

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Faith is being sure of what is hoped for and certain in things unseen.

 

 

(1) “The end of reason is the beginning of faith”, Fear and Trembling. This is why Kierkegaarde has often been described as the Father of Existentialism. Namely, because he first identified our inability to know our essence, who we are, our purpose for existence, using reason alone. He discovered the limits of reason, something that Renaissance thinkers, for example, thought was impossible. In so doing, he demonstrated the absolute necessity for us to take a “leap of faith”, a phrase he first coined. For Kierkegaarde, this was a faith in God, but it was first and foremost a call to action, something that both Sartre and Nietzsche equally recognised was essential in order to attempt to define who we are and transcend our predicament.

 


Chapter seven - Nihilism

 

Truth!!

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The Teacher: So let's now return to post-ironic advertising and that wobbly jelly to see where we stand today. In a nutshell, then, it’s saying: our product’s bad for you, you know it, we know it, but consume it anyway (cos' you know you want to!)

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In other words:  you were right to doubt us when we said it was good for you (Nb. with the wobbly jelly, no attempt has been made to say how wonderful the programmes on that night are). We know you know it's not (it’s just a pile of wobbly jelly). Therefore, we're not lying to you anymore, we're telling you the truth that you've always known i.e. telly is essentially bad for you and turns you into a mindless moron, who’ll sit there and watch wobbling jelly on a plate all day, as a general rule. It is telling it as it is, to some degree, and yet if it was really being honest and telling us the truth, the advert would say: so don't watch TV, go and do something worthwhile. Obviously, this is something that they'd never do; therefore, it's very much on the producers terms - our product is shit and bad for you, but now we both admit to knowing this (again an acknowledgement of the truth), you still like watching it, (don't you) so do it then.

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The Pupil: It’s become very cynical.

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The Teacher: Yes. It is cynical in the way it has such disrespect and disregard for the content of the word truth. Here the truth has gone from television is good for you and our product is good, to the truth (the real truth) that in fact, television is bad for you and the product is consequently bad. It's the flipside of the coin. Both definitions can act as the signified without the signifier (the word truth) having to change. But in doing so, the gap between the signifier and the signified widens another notch and becomes more unbridgeable. When the signified can be changed like this for the same signifier, the credibility of what is signified is irredeemably destroyed through a process of mistrust. When people see the flippancy with which advertisers (and here we can substitute Politicians and get the same effect, I feel) use the word truth (through the changing definition of the signified) they begin to mistrust them, rightly believing that if they can change the definitions so flippantly then they are not to be believed at all. With this type of "post-ironic advertising" the irony is that by telling the truth the advertisers are in effect actually destroying the credibility of the word (what it signifies). They are in effect proving its emptiness. IT IS THE NEGATION OF THE TRUTH.

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They are actually telling the whole truth of their intentions. They are hiding nothing. They are candid about their product – it’s shit, yet they are equally as candid about their intentions as the producer i.e. we still want you to buy our product. So what we have here is a return to a modern message i.e. a truth, an absolute statement, a narrative. This, then, is a return to an important aspect of modernism. (See footnote 1)

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In a sense, then, the journalist is right to use the term post-ironic; there is no saying one thing and meaning another, in the entire context of the sentence. What they say and what they mean are the same.

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The student: But does this then imply that we live in modern age again?

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The Teacher: I would argue it shows just how much we don't. It demonstrates this by dismantling once again (if there was anything to dismantle in the first place!) the whole credibility and therefore LEGITIMISATION of the signified, to the extent where it is now no longer possible to describe the signified as legitimate (legitimised - known to be the immovable, immanement fact, way it is, truth).

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However, the term "post" is significant and is an important clue as to where we are now heading, philosophically.

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We have a modern message, with no tricks of postmodernism, speaking to a supposedly postmodern age (an age that doubts truth). As a result, the only truth we can take is the harshest, most candid, most revealing, most honest kind; which sounds great until we realise that by doing exactly this, the advertisers actually demonstrate that we were right to doubt them in the first place.

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The optimism, therefore, has completely gone from the modern message. Where previously in the modern age there was a hope, a belief, if you will, that there must be a universal meaning that makes sense of everything (see footnote 2), we now have a situation where the very means of appropriating that universal meaning (finding the ultimate source of legitimisation, the legitimiser) has been deconstructed and shown to be empty and content-less. I'm referring here to the relationship between the signifier and the signified and the widening of the gap between them, after the initial break that linguistics first picked up on. The gap just keeps getting wider, to the extent where it is fair to say we have reached the place where truth is no longer possible.

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The Student: Yeah, but you’ve just said that the advertisers in post-ironic advertising are doing exactly this i.e. telling the truth. What's going on?

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The Teacher: The truth is being told and yet, by this very act, it condemns itself to be destroyed as a signified with any significancy, or a legitimate with any legitimacy. The truth has negated itself.

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The student: So is this postmodernism, a fundamental suspicion of all truths?

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The Teacher: Today the suspicion has become more of a belief. In some quarters, there is a belief that in terms of the universal, there is no such thing. In other words, there is no such thing as THE truth; it is impossibility, given where we are at and what we have come to think of the world (or, more accurately, where philosophy has brought us to - the end of reason). This is Baudriallard's position and it is an absolute statement in itself and therefore arguably not postmodern anymore at all. It's not a suspicion, it's a belief: a firm position held to be true by the subject. Baudriallard is sometimes called a radical postmodernist. However, I would argue that if we're now talking in terms of a fundamental belief that all meta-narratives are false (by very definition of being meta-narratives, because meta-narratives are proven to be no longer possible), then this is not postmodernism, it's post-postmodernism. This is a rather cumbersome term for explaining the philosophical position of mankind as we enter the year 2000. In essence, it is modern nihilism.

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The student: Is this any different, then, from Nietzsche or Sartre?

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The Teacher: Yes, because Nietzsche was on a quest, the Nietzschean quest: "to become what one is". Sartre expressed it in terms of a quest to unify the subject and the object (en-soi and pour-soi). The end was the same: self-authentication, though each in his own way, in my opinion, failed to fulfil and complete their aims. (See footnote 3)

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But what we have now is different from this, even though it is modern in the sense that this is an absolute position to take and there is a belief in an absolute meta-narrative, one that is universal.

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The student: IT IS A PURE FORM OF NIHILISM. IT IS THE END OF NIHILISM!!!

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The Teacher: (laughing) Well, Nihilism has been perfected, made complete. It is the self-realisation of the spirit, in a Hegelian sense; the perfection of the spirit. It is the spirit of our times and the perfection of the spirit. There is no place from here for us, whilst we stay in the realm of the material world. The end of history (the victory of the West and the spread of free market economies underpinned by a liberal democracy, according to Fukayama), the end of philosophy (Heidegger and Derrida argue this is the same as the end of metaphysics, I would argue the end of philosophy is the end of reason and, by extension, the end of materialism), the end is Nihilism; objective truths are destroyed, the very things we require to authenticate and legitimise subjective truths. Consequently, legitimisation is impossible. Not only this, but the means of appropriating objective truths is also destroyed; the very act of going on a quest to find the legitimiser, the ultimate source of legitimisation is declared redundant because of a supposition in the impossibility of such a task. This all adds up to the belief that life is essentially meaningless, even though many of us don’t necessarily live like this. As I explained before, I think this is merely because most of us are not aware of where our own logic leads. It leads us to this position: the essential meaningless of everything; which is exactly why so few of us will articulate this or except it, because it contradicts our inherent desire built into the human condition: TO HAVE MEANING IN OUR LIVES, TO HAVE MEANING TO OUR LIVES.

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So, I am saying this is the position where philosophy has led us. It has led us to the end of nihilism.

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The Student: Is this the prevailing worldview?

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The Teacher: I'm not sure, but it's certainly getting that way. Perhaps you could argue in art, culture, and in terms of a worldview, we're still postmodern (though there are one or two examples that demonstrate a progression (regression) from this, such as South Park and post-ironic advertising), whilst in terms of philosophy, we have reached the end of nihilism. Philosophy has reached its self-authentication in nihilism. This is the next step on from postmodernism. 

 

 

 

1. Certain adverts were doing this anyway. Some were merely using the appropriate means of communication for the purpose in hand i.e. if the target audience has a postmodern worldview then speak to this worldview, not a modern one. And of course, certain producers have no choice now but to resort to this type of advertising, because there is no real difference between many products (in fact, there is only differance between them; Derrida's differance).

 

2. Even though in existentialism, the last real modern philosophy, this hope is shown to be not necessarily any more than this, i.e. an impossibility according to reason, but nevertheless something that must be pursued despite the fact that the outcome doesn't in itself solve anything. Rather, as Nietzsche pointed out, there is a constant dilemma to be confronted and transcended every waking minute; life being an eternal cycle/series of the same dilemma, namely the need for authentication (legitimisation).

 

3. Nietzsche has often been called a nihilist, in the sense that he was never able to ultimately escape from the accusation that reading his philosophy, you could infer life was essentially meaningless for him. The issue is in doubt.

Nietzsche wanted to transcend nihilism and Thus Spoke Zarathustra is an attempt to do this. The question, I think, is how successful did he pull this off?